BRUSSELS – The United Arab Emirates has been assessed as the Rapid Support Forces’ primary foreign backer in Sudan’s war, providing the paramilitary group with weapons and other forms of support, according to a new report by the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA).
The October 2026 report said Abu Dhabi has consistently rejected allegations that it supports the RSF, which has been fighting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) since April 2023.
The EUAA report examines Sudan’s security situation between March 2025 and August 2026 and draws on information from governments, international organizations, human rights groups, research institutions and media sources.
It said multiple foreign countries have become involved in the conflict through arms, funding or diplomatic support, identifying the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Türkiye among the key international actors.
According to U.S. intelligence sources cited in the report, the UAE supplied the RSF with advanced Chinese-manufactured drones, small arms, heavy machine guns, artillery, mortars and vehicles.
The report also cited an Amnesty International investigation that identified Chinese-made GB50A guided bombs and 155mm AH-4 howitzers that it said had been re-exported by the UAE to the RSF.
The growing availability of advanced drones has significantly changed Sudan’s battlefield. By the first half of 2026, armed drones had become the leading cause of civilian deaths from aerial attacks, with strikes increasingly reaching areas far from the main front lines.
The EUAA report said RSF drone capabilities included Chinese-made long-range systems supplied by the UAE, alongside other unmanned aircraft used for reconnaissance and strikes.
Mercenaries and Supply Routes
The report said that since 2024, a UAE-based security company with links to Abu Dhabi’s political leadership had reportedly facilitated the transfer of Colombian mercenaries to Sudan to support the RSF.
Foreign fighters have become another feature of the conflict, while the RSF has also expanded recruitment among Sudanese communities and allied armed groups as fighting shifted toward Darfur, Kordofan and Blue Nile.
The EUAA said the UAE reportedly used logistical supply routes through eastern Chad, southeastern Libya and northeastern Somalia to move military assistance to the RSF.
Those routes began changing in late 2025 as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Somalia reportedly restricted UAE overflight access and authorities in eastern Libya temporarily closed Kufra airport, according to the report.
In early 2026, the report cited information indicating that the UAE had financed construction of a military training camp in Ethiopia near the Blue Nile border and sent military instructors there.
Ethiopian security officials estimated in January that about 4,300 RSF fighters were undergoing training at the site, according to information cited by the EUAA.
By March, the UAE was reportedly exploring new aerial transport routes through countries including Ethiopia and the Central African Republic to maintain support for the RSF.
Gold, Agriculture and Red Sea Interests
The report said UAE support for the RSF had also been linked to broader economic and strategic interests in Sudan.
It cited assessments that Abu Dhabi sought to protect access to Sudanese gold, safeguard agricultural investments and maintain influence along the Red Sea coast.
The report also said concerns about Islamist currents aligned with the Sudanese army were reported to be among the factors influencing the UAE’s position in the conflict.
Sudan’s gold sector has played an increasingly important role in financing armed actors during the war, while competition over Red Sea access, agriculture and regional influence has added an international dimension to a conflict rooted in Sudan’s domestic political and military crisis.
The EUAA said foreign involvement has extended beyond the UAE. Saudi Arabia has provided economic support to the SAF, while Egypt has maintained close military ties with Sudan’s army and sought to preserve Sudan’s territorial unity and a centralized state.
The report portrays Sudan’s war as increasingly shaped by overlapping domestic and international interests, with foreign weapons, financing, logistical networks and diplomatic backing contributing to the military capacity of the opposing sides.
Abu Dhabi has repeatedly denied supplying weapons to the RSF or supporting either side in Sudan’s war.
