GENEVA – A United Nations fact-finding mission said external support networks are sustaining Sudan’s war by supplying weapons, drones, logistics, training and foreign personnel to the warring parties, warning that expanding drone warfare has exposed civilians far beyond front lines.

In a report submitted to the UN Human Rights Council’s 63rd session, the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan said external support is sustaining military operations and expanding the capabilities of the parties to the conflict, with grave consequences for civilians.

The mission said increasingly sophisticated drone capabilities had enabled both sides to strike far beyond immediate front lines, while attacks documented by investigators affected civilians, hospitals, schools, markets and displacement sites, including attacks that may amount to war crimes.

Transnational Network Supporting RSF

The report said the mission had reasonable grounds to believe that a transnational network supplied the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) with weapons, logistics, training and foreign personnel, including Colombian contractors involved in advanced weapons and drone systems.

The mission said evidence indicated that locations in Chad, southeastern Libya and Puntland in Somalia functioned as transit and logistical hubs through which weapons, personnel and military supplies were moved into RSF-controlled areas.

It also said it obtained evidence linking individuals and entities based in the United Arab Emirates to elements of these supply arrangements.

According to the report, witnesses and independent sources described the transfer of artillery systems, air-defense systems, radars, armored vehicles, Land Cruisers, uniforms, ammunition, weapons and medical supplies through routes involving Bosaso, Benghazi, Kufra, Jufra and Chad before reaching RSF-controlled areas.

The mission also said it received information about drone-related equipment transferred to the RSF, including CH-95 reconnaissance and strike drones, electronic warfare capabilities and associated technical support.

Nyala Airport and Drone Operations

The report identified Nyala Airport as a principal entry point for supplies into RSF-controlled territory.

It said the mission received information that RSF members supported by Colombian contractors launched drones from Nyala against areas controlled by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), including Kordofan and Khartoum states.

The mission said it verified footage of drone remnants consistent with CH-95/FH-95 systems at multiple locations across Sudan, including El Fasher, Nyala and El Obeid.

Verified footage from El Obeid on Feb. 28, 2026, showed a downed drone assessed as an FH-95 on the roof of a civilian house in the city center, the report said.

Colombian Contractors

The mission said recruitment and deployment of foreign contractors, particularly Colombian nationals, formed a significant component of the transnational support network for RSF operations from at least August 2024.

It said estimates of Colombian contractors varied from 350 to 2,000, adding that, based on credible independent sources and information that recruitment remained ongoing, the total number may approach 2,000.

The report said some contractors were not informed at recruitment that they would be deployed to Sudan, while others reportedly received lower salaries than stipulated in their contracts.

The mission said Colombian contractors played a significant role in operating and maintaining surveillance, strike and one-way attack drones, supporting artillery deployment and other advanced weapons systems, and providing intelligence, technical maintenance and military instruction.

It also said several sources indicated that Colombian contractors, particularly members of the “Desert Wolves” Battalion, were present in and around El Fasher before, during and after its takeover by the RSF.

Foreign Fighters From Neighboring States

The mission said witnesses also reported fighters from South Sudan, Chad and Ethiopia, including women, serving mainly in frontline rather than technical roles.

It said photographic, video and documentary evidence indicated that foreign fighters, drone operators, technicians and military specialists were integrated into RSF operations, particularly in advanced weapons systems and other technical capabilities.

The report concluded that the RSF benefited from a transnational support network involving weapons, military material, logistical assistance, training and foreign personnel.

It said private companies, intermediaries and associated individuals operating across Colombia, the UAE, Chad, Libya and Somalia facilitated elements of the network.

Preliminary Findings on SAF External Support

The mission said its findings on external support to the Sudanese Armed Forces remain preliminary, but said available evidence indicates that since late 2023, the SAF significantly expanded drone capabilities through foreign-supplied systems.

The report said technical analysis of imagery and footage identified features consistent with Bayraktar Akıncı combat drones, including propulsion components, propeller assemblies, munition-release mechanisms and manufacturer markings on recovered wreckage.

It said footage from Nyala and Al-Farshaya was assessed as likely depicting Akıncı platforms.

The mission also said images from the attack on Yabus Market in Blue Nile on March 29 or 30, 2026, were assessed by military experts as showing components consistent with a Yiha III loitering munition, which it said further indicated SAF use of foreign-supplied drones.

Based on available information, the mission said it had reasonable grounds to believe the SAF used foreign-supplied drones and loitering munitions in attacks that struck civilian objects, including Yabus Market, and that such attacks may amount to serious violations of international humanitarian law and war crimes.

Drone War Expands Civilian Harm

The report said drone warfare has changed the nature of Sudan’s conflict by extending the geographical reach of hostilities and prolonging fighting, including during the rainy season.

It said RSF drones were used extensively around El Fasher and in attacks on Merowe Dam, Port Sudan, Omdurman, Khartoum and El Obeid, while SAF aerial operations, including drones, reached locations deep inside RSF-held Darfur, including Ad-Da’ein and Nyala.

The mission cited OHCHR documentation of more than 1,000 civilians killed in drone strikes between January and May 2026.

It said it had collected evidence of attacks affecting health facilities, schools, places of worship, markets, displacement sites, civilian gatherings including weddings and funerals, and energy infrastructure.

RSF-Attributed Attacks

In El Obeid, the mission said repeated RSF drone attacks between May and July 2026 damaged or disrupted electricity and fuel infrastructure, affecting water supply, health care, transport and other essential services.

The report also said witnesses described near-daily drone attacks in El Obeid affecting military positions, residential areas, fuel supplies, electricity and water infrastructure, causing civilian casualties and further disrupting services.

In Kalogi, South Kordofan, the mission said successive drone strikes on Nabaa al-Hanan Kindergarten and Kalogi Rural Hospital killed 114 people, including about 60 children, and injured 35.

It said the hospital ceased operating for about 45 days because staff and residents feared further strikes.

In Kulba, Kadugli, the mission said an RSF drone struck former International Organization for Migration premises used to shelter displaced families, killing at least five civilians, including children, and injuring others.

SAF-Attributed Attacks

The mission said it had reasonable grounds to believe the SAF carried out successive drone strikes on Ad-Da’ein Teaching Hospital in East Darfur on March 20, 2026, killing at least 70 people, injuring 146 and rendering the hospital non-functional.

It also said it had reasonable grounds to believe the SAF carried out a drone strike on civilian commercial premises in Abu Zaima market in Hamrat El Sheikh, North Kordofan, where civilians were present.

In Yabus, southern Blue Nile, the mission said a drone attack attributed to the SAF struck the main market and nearby water-pump area, killing at least 13 civilians, injuring others including women and children, damaging a nearby medical facility and disrupting commerce and services.

The mission also documented further SAF-attributed drone attacks affecting areas with substantial civilian presence, including a wedding gathering in Kutum, a displacement camp in Zalingei, and a customary court session in Ghara al-Zawiya village in North Darfur.

Women and Children Hit Hard

The report said drone attacks produced differentiated harms for women and girls by interacting with pre-existing gender inequalities, displacement and barriers to essential services.

It said women and children were repeatedly among those killed and injured in drone attacks documented by the mission.

It said attacks on health facilities and critical infrastructure disrupted maternal health services, while health workers reported increases in miscarriages, stillbirths and pregnancy complications during periods of repeated aerial attacks.

The mission also said children were affected both as direct victims and through damage to infrastructure necessary for survival and development, including hospitals, schools, water systems and displacement sites.

Government and RSF Cooperation

The mission said Sudan continued not to cooperate with its work, despite requests for meetings and permission to visit Sudan.

It said it shared the final draft of the report with the Sudanese government on Aug. 28, 2026, but received no response.

The mission also said it sought information from the RSF through letters in May and August 2026.

The RSF proposed a roundtable discussion on June 8, and the mission confirmed its readiness to engage, but no further response was received.

Calls for Arms Embargo and Accountability

The mission called on states to stop military support that risks fueling violations, enforce the Darfur arms embargo, trace and halt transfers of drones, weapons, components, technical assistance and other military support where there is a substantial risk of use in serious violations, and impose targeted sanctions on those implicated.

It also called on the UN Security Council to extend the arms embargo throughout Sudan.

The mission further called for accountability across the full chain of responsibility, including those who commit, order, finance, supply or otherwise facilitate international crimes.

It urged support for cooperation with the International Criminal Court and the establishment of a specialized independent judicial mechanism for Sudan.

The report concluded that both the SAF and RSF committed serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law during drone operations, with some conduct amounting to war crimes.

It said expanded drone capabilities enabled both parties to strike far beyond front lines, but did not produce greater civilian protection.